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I. Introduction
The impact of TTIPleaks on the negotiations of and
debate about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) has been more limited than its
name and announcement would lead us to expect.
This is, first, because the leaked ‘consolidated docu-
ments’ only show the European Union’s (EU) and
United States’ (US) positions on a number of negoti-
ating areas but does not unveil concessions made by
either side in the pursuit of a compromise. Therefore,
it contains little surprising information for observers
of the negotiations. But a second reason for the lack
of uproar is that for only about half of the expected
chapters in TTIP a text has been leaked, either be-
cause there is no consolidated text yet for the other
issues in thenegotiations or becauseGreenpreace did
not get hold of it.
One of the chapters lacking in the TTIPleaks is on
‘Trade and Sustainable Development’. This is an in-
teresting issue area because the advocates often ar-
gue that this chapter will help ensure that TTIP up-
holdsandstrengthenssocial andenvironmental stan-
dards1.However, the credibility of this claimdepends
on how strong this chapter will eventually turn out
to be. A leaked consolidated text could have given us
an indication of this.
In this short piece,wewill speculate about the pos-
sible outcomes in this area. In the remainder of this
article we will focus primarily on labour provisions2.
However, our conclusions to large extent also apply
to environmental provisions in TTIP. While these
provisions touch upon a wide variety of issues relat-
ed to sustainable development, many concern areas
of social and environmental risk regulation, such as
with regard to health and safety at work or trade in
and environmentally sound management of chemi-
cals and waste. We will, in the next section, explain
that the EU and the US have different approaches to
the inclusion of labour provisions in free trade agree-
ments (FTAs). We will then argue that these two ap-
proaches can be integrated in a lowest common de-
nominator or a highest common denominator way
(this should rather be seen as a continuum of poten-
tial outcomes), and we will outline what we already
know about TTIP in this area. We conclude that if
the negotiators want to live up to their promise that
TTIP will have beneficial social and environmental
effects they should integrate the EU and US ap-
proaches at the highest level.
II. EU and US Approaches to Trade and
Labour
Both the EU and theUS started to include labour pro-
visions in their FTAs in the mid-1990s. The US initi-
ated this practice with the North American Agree-
ment on Labour Cooperation (NAALC) as a parallel
agreement to the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), which was signed in 1992 and en-
tered into force in 1994. In the EU, this started with
the agreements with countries at the southern shore
of the Mediterranean, called Euro-Med Agreements,
of which the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement
signed in 1995 was the first.3 Both entities developed
this approach further in the coming two decades.
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1 Cecilia Malmström, “TTIP – what’s in it for labour, environment
and sustainable development”, 6 November 2015, available on
the Internet at: <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/
malmstrom/blog/ttip-whats-it-labour-environment-and-sustainable
-development_en> (last accessed on 16 May 2016).
2 We do this because of word constraints, because the literatures
on labour and environmental provisions in trade agreements have
been quite separated, because most scholarship on trade and
sustainable development has focused on labour rights, and
because the US has the tradition to deal with labour and environ-
mental provisions separately (while the EU integrates them in a
sustainable development chapter). This difference in structuring
labour and environmental provisions could be accommodated by
including chapters in TTIP on trade and labour, trade and envi-
ronment and trade and sustainable development, as in the EU-
Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement.
3 Lore Van den Putte and Jan Orbie, “EU bilateral trade agreements
and the surprising rise of labour provisions“, 31 International
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations
(2015), pp. 263 et sqq.
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Labour provisions in EU and US FTAs not only
evolvedover time, both also adapted theseprovisions
to some extent to the partner country in such treaties.
However, a current template or approach can be dis-
cerned for both entities. The EU’s approach to labour
provisions in trade agreements is often called ‘pro-
motional’ or ‘soft’ while the US template is often
termed ‘conditional’ or ‘hard’4. In more specific
terms, how do the EU’s and US’ approaches to trade
and labour differ?
In terms of the substantial provisions included in
these agreements, EU FTAs incorporate multilateral
instruments, most importantly the Core Labour Con-
ventions of the International Labour Organisation
(ILO) and more recently also the ILO’s Decent Work
Agenda. Its trade agreements stipulate that parties
reaffirmtheir commitment to theDecentWorkAgen-
da and commit to respecting, promoting and realis-
ing in their laws and practices, the fundamental
rights of the 1998 ILO Declaration. Moreover, EU
agreements require that the parties shall effectively
implement the ILO Conventions that they have rati-
fied and that they should make sustained efforts to-
wards ratifying the other fundamental Conventions
as well as other Conventions classified as ‘up-to-date’
by the ILO. In the case of US trade agreements a new
template for labour provisions was drafted in 2007
with the May 10 bipartisan Congressional-Executive
agreement5. In contrast to the EU, the US does nei-
ther refer to ILOConventionsnor to theDecentWork
Agenda, but only states that each party shall adopt
andmaintain in its statutes and regulations and prac-
tices the rights as stated in the 1998 ILO Declaration.
The explanation for this is straightforward: the US
has only ratified two out of the eight Core Labour
Conventions. A non-lowering clause in both the EU’s
and US’ FTAs stipulates that the parties shall not
waive or otherwise derogate from (or offer to waive
or derogate from) its labour laws in a manner affect-
ing trade or investment between the parties6.
Apart from this fixed template, the US often adds
additional requirements to trade agreements that
partners should successfully implement as a precon-
dition for the FTA to enter into force. These are of-
ten very detailed requirements, such as the hiring of
a specified number of labour inspectors and assign-
ing a specified number of judicial police investigators
to support prosecutors in charge of investigating
criminal cases involving union members and ac-
tivists, like in the Colombian Action Plan Related to
LaborRights7. TheEUagreementsalso include labour
rights commitments that go beyond the ILO Core
Conventions.However, it concerns a general commit-
ment without reference to specific laws or practices,
and there is no pre-ratification conditionality8.
With regard to enforcement, the EU opts for soft
mechanisms such as dialogue, cooperation and nam-
ing and shaming. It foresees a civil society dialogue
mechanism through which civil society organisa-
tions meet both domestically as well as transnation-
ally to discuss the implementation of the sustainable
development chapter. Besides, in case of an alleged
labour violation, a party may request government
consultations through which the parties shall make
every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory so-
lution. If they don’t, ultimately, a party (but not civ-
il society organisations) may request that a panel of
experts be convened to examine thematter. This pan-
el may issue recommendations on the implementa-
tion of the chapter on sustainable development. In
EU FTAs, it is explicitly stipulated that parties only
have recourse to the procedures mentioned above
and, consequently, not to the general dispute settle-
ment provisions of the agreement. This is the main
difference with enforcement provisions for labour
provisions in US agreements. US FTAs also foresee
dialogue and cooperation (including, but to a more
limited extent, with civil society) through a Labor Af-
fairs Council and stipulate that the parties shall ini-
tially seek to resolve disputes through these consul-
tative mechanisms. Contrary to the EU’s approach,
4 International Institute for Labour Studies, “Social Dimensions of
Free Trade Agreements”, 6 November 2013, available on the
Internet at: <http://www.ilo.org/global/research/publications/WCMS
_228965/lang--en/index.htm> (last accessed on 18 May 2016).
5 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Bipartisan
Agreement on Trade Policy”, May 2007, available on the Internet
at: <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset
_upload_file127_11319.pdf> (last accessed on 16 May 2016).
6 The interesting question how these provisions may affect the
interpretation of other chapters of TTIP, such as on investment
(and investment protection in particular), is beyond the scope of
this article. Similarly, we do not discuss provisions on sustainable
development in other chapters than the one dedicated to this
topic specifically.
7 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Colombian
Action Plan Related to Labor Rights”, April 7 2011, available on
the Internet at: <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/
agreements/morocco/pdfs/Colombian%20Action%20Plan
%20Related%20to%20Labor%20Rights.pdf> (last accessed on 16
May 2016).
8 Jeffrey Vogt, ”The Evolution of Labor Rights and Trade—A Transat-
lantic Comparison and Lessons for the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership”, 18 Journal of International Economic Law
(2015) pp. 827 et sqq. 
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however, any person may file a submission with the
US government regarding alleged non-compliance
with the labour commitments. Ultimately, these pro-
cedures could lead to a case before the general dis-
pute settlement mechanism of the agreement. This
implies that non-implementation of labour provi-
sions in US FTAs can result in sanctions, while this
is not possible under EU agreements9.
III. Labour Provisions in TTIP
Howwill these templates be integrated in TTIP? The
differences between the EU and US approach to
labour provisions can be combined in a lowest or a
highest common denominator way. On the lowest
common denominator side, substantially, the rele-
vant chapter in TTIP would only require the parties
to comply with the fundamental rights included in
the 1998 ILO declaration (while only finding a viola-
tion if a failure to comply with this declaration af-
fects transatlantic trade or investment), without the
obligation to respect the Core Labour Conventions
or the requirement to (strive to) ratify them, neither
would other labour standards such as those includ-
ed in the ILO Decent Work Agenda be mentioned.
With regard to enforcement, no recourse to the dis-
pute settlement, no possibility of sanctions and no
extensive involvement of civil society would be fore-
seen. At the highest common denominator side, the
clear obligation to comply with (and possibly even
to ratify) Core Labour Conventions and the decent
work agenda would be combined with enforcement
provisions thatwould both seriously involve and em-
power civil society (including trade unions) in the
implementation of the trade agreement. In addition,
it would allow for sanctions as the ultimate instru-
ment to ensure compliance.
As stated at thebeginningof this article, TTIPleaks
did not contain a document about labour provisions.
What doweknowabout this issue area inTTIP, then?
The European Commission made public its textu-
al proposal on Trade and Sustainable Development
on 6 November 201510. This proposal starts with a
disclaimer stating that ‘additional proposals, includ-
ing on institutional aspects, civil society participa-
tion and dispute settlement, will be developed at a
later stage’. Hence, the provisional textual proposal
of the EU mainly contains substantial provisions.
Section I lays out the context (art. 1) and the objec-
tives (art. 2) of the Chapter and reaffirms the parties’
right to regulate in the area of sustainable develop-
ment in amanner not inconsistent with themultilat-
eral labour standards and agreements included in art.
4 and multilateral environmental governance and
rules included in art. 10. Section II deals with the
labour aspects of trade and sustainable development
(arts. 4-9) while Section III is about the environmen-
tal aspects (arts. 10-16). Finally, Section IV deals with
horizontal issues (arts. 17-21).
Art. 4 on multilateral labour standards and agree-
ments contains themost important substantial oblig-
ations. It states (§ 1) that the parties agree to promote
the development of their trade and investment rela-
tions in a manner conducive to the realisation of the
DecentWorkAgenda and its four strategic objectives
(employment protection, social protection, social di-
alogue and fundamental principles and rights at
work). With regard to the latter strategic objective,
§ 2 stipulates that eachparty shall ensure that its laws
and practices respect, promote and realise the funda-
mental ILO Conventions and in this context, to con-
tinue to make sustained efforts towards ratifying
these Conventions and their Protocols, as well as oth-
er Conventions and their Protocols that are classified
as up-to-date by the ILO. Paragraph 3 states that each
party shall ensure toprotect health and safety atwork
anddecentworking conditions for all, includingwith
regard towages andearnings,workinghours andoth-
er conditions of work in order to ensure a minimum
living wage. The remainder of art. 4 states that the
parties: shall effectively implement the ILO Conven-
tions theyhave ratified (§ 4); shall implement the rec-
ommendations adopted by the ILO where they exist
in areas covered by up-to-date Conventions (§ 5); and
recognise the need of an adequate system of labour
inspections to ensure the effective enforcement of
their labour laws (§ 6). The final paragraph (§ 7) of
art. 4, balancing the prohibitions of social dumping
and disguised protectionism, states that the parties
recognise that the violation of fundamental princi-
ples and rights at work cannot be invoked or other-
9 The possibility for sanctions remains largely hypothetical for now
as only one public submission on labour violations in Guatemala
has reached the stage of dispute settlement. At the time of writing,
the outcome is still uncertain.
10 European Commission, “EU Textual Proposal: Trade and Sustain-
able Development”, 6 November 2015, available on the Internet
at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc
_153923.pdf> (last accessed on 16 May 2016).
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wise used as a legitimate comparative advantage and
that labour standards shouldnotbeused for arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination or protectionist pur-
poses.
Articles 5 to 8 then specify in considerable detail
the obligations that respect of the fundamental
labour rights entails, namelywith regard to: freedom
of association and the right to collective bargaining
(art. 5; ILO Conventions 87 and 98), elimination of
forced or compulsory labour (art. 6; ILOConventions
29 and 105), effective abolition of child labour (art.
7; ILO Conventions 138 and 182) and equality and
non-discrimination in respect of employment andoc-
cupation (art. 8; ILOConventions 100 and 111). Art. 9,
finally, lays out a number of priority areas and activ-
ities for the parties to cooperate on the labour aspects
of trade and sustainable development at bilateral, re-
gional and global level.
Substantially, the EU textual proposal on labour
aspects of trade and sustainable development is rel-
atively ambitious. With the provisions on enforce-
ment (institutional aspects, civil societyparticipation
and dispute settlement) not included yet, this leaves
open the possibility for a highest common denomi-
nator compromise, if the US would accept this sub-
stantial EU proposal, and would itself put forward a
proposal on dispute settlement that includes the pos-
sibility to have recourse to the general dispute settle-
ment mechanism of the agreement in case of viola-
tions of labour provisions.
The US position can be derived from its ‘Biparti-
san Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountabil-
ity Act of 2015’11 (also known as Trade Promotion
Authority, or TPA) and more specifically from Sec-
tion 2 Trade Negotiating Objectives, (b) Principal
Trade Negotiating Objectives, (10) Labor and the En-
vironment. The TPA does not seem to preclude a
highest common denominator compromise. It sets
out as US negotiating objectives to ensure that the
parties adopt and maintain measures implementing
internationally recognized core labour standards and
that they do notwaive or derogate from their statutes
or regulations implementing these core labour stan-
dards and do not fail to enforce their labour laws ef-
fectively in a matter affecting trade or investment.
This is in line with the traditional US approach. It
does not go as far as the EU textual proposal but the
latter is also not in contradiction with the US TPA.
With regard to enforcement, the TPA mandates the
United States TradeRepresentative to ensure that en-
forceable labour obligations are subject to the same
dispute settlement and remedies as other enforceable
obligations under the agreement.
Hence it seems that a highest common denomina-
tor compromise on trade and labour should be pos-
sible in TTIP.What might still be problematic on the
European side is that the European Parliament in its
Resolution on TTIP of 8 July 2015 has asked the Eu-
ropean Commission ‘to ensure that the sustainable
development chapter … aims at the full and effective
ratification, implementation and enforcement of the
eight fundamental International Labour Organisa-
tion (ILO) Conventions and their content, the ILO’s
Decent Work Agenda and the core international en-
vironmental agreements’12. This is also the position
of the European Trade Union Confederation13. It has
been argued that the difficulty for the US to ratify
Core Labour Conventions is related to the US feder-
al system. After the US rejoined the ILO in 1980, it
was stipulated in a 1988 US Senate resolution that
‘there is no intention to change State law and prac-
ticebyFederal action through ratificationof ILOCon-
ventions’14. But as the European Parliament and
ETUC also ask that labour provisions be enforceable
before the general dispute settlement mechanism, a
compromise seems plausible where the EU does not
require the US to ratify the six Core Labour Conven-
tions it has not ratified yet, the US agrees with the
EU’s more ambitious substantial provisions, and the
EU accepts (in line with EP and ETUC demands) en-
forceability of labour provisions before the general
dispute settlementmechanism. In its state of play af-
ter the 12th Round of negotiations, the EU seems to
indicate that its strategy is to trade off ambition on
substance for enforceability: ‘[d]iscussions about en-
11 US Congress, “Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and
Accountability Act of 2015”, 11 May 2015, available on the
Internet at: <https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/s995/BILLS
-114s995rs.pdf> (last accessed on 16 May 2016).
12 European Parliament resolution of 8 July 2015 containing the
European Parliament’s recommendations to the European Com-
mission on the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership TTIP, 2014/2228(INI).
13 ETUC, “Position on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership”, 25 April 2013, available on the Internet at: <https://
www.etuc.org/documents/etuc-position-transatlantic-trade-and
-investment-partnership#.VzmPI0t2mSA> (last accessed on 16
May 2016).
14 See United States Council for International Business, “Issue
Analysis: U.S. Ratification of ILO Core Labor Standards”, April
2007, available on the Internet at: <https://www.uscib.org/docs/
US_Ratification_of_ILO_Core_Conventions.pdf> (last accessed on
16 May 2016).
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forceability could be addressed as soon as there is
sufficient common understanding on the substan-
tive disciplines for the chapter’15.
IV. Conclusions
The chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development,
and its labour aspects in particular, are an important
part of TTIP. The advocates of the agreement often
refer to this chapter to argue that TTIP will uphold
and strengthen rather than weaken labour and envi-
ronmental standards. In this article, we have argued
that to live up to this promise (and hence to help en-
sure trade unions’ and other civil society actors’ sup-
port of TTIP), the negotiators have to integrate the
EU’s and US’ approaches to trade and labour in FTAs
at the highest common denominator. While requir-
ing the US to ratify the Core Labour Conventions
seems politically difficult, this would imply that the
US accepts the EU’s more ambitious substantial pro-
visions while the EU accepts the US’ approach to dis-
pute settlement, including the possibility of sanc-
tions in case of non-compliance. While this may still
not be themost optimal approach froma social rights
perspective (as ratification of ILO conventions does
make a difference), it would have the advantage of
combining the strengths of the EU’s and US’ ap-
proaches.Moreover, the new templatemight provide
a ‘gold standard’ for future trade agreements conclud-
ed by the US and the EU.
15 European Commission, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) – State of Play”, 27 April 2016, p. 6, available
on the Internet at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/
april/tradoc_154477.pdf> (last accessed on 16 May 2016).
